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Motto 
 
Native Americans did not believe that they had sold Manhattan Island for $23 
worth of trinkets, no matter what the Dutch thought. Native Americans revere the 
land in much the same way that Africans do. No king or clan leader could sell 
what did not belong to him. On the basis of the European contractual custom, the 
Dutch may have thought they were purchasing the island from the Indians, but 
this was obviously a view based on their own commercial traditions (Asante, 
2001, 77) 
 
Key words: social constructivism, relativism, managerialism, critical theory, 
organizing, improvisation 
 
Abstract 
 
Academic communities in social sciences are still dominated by neo-positivist 
paradigm, but communities of practice developing social constructivism have 
started to redress paradigmatic imbalances. According to the latter man-made 
organizational reality is processual and saturated with sensemaking (Weick). 
Social constructivists succeeded in reconstructing complex organizational 
disasters and contributed to organizational innovation and change (for instance in 
the wake of ICT challenges). They belong to postmodernist critics of modernity’s 
failure to regulate social development and contribute to a better understanding of 
organizing (e.g. implementing a new technology or managing knowledge 
production) as patchworking and improvising. In spite of discriminating 
practices, they survive in academic communities. 
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1. Introduction; neo-positivists, social constructivists and organizational 
“lifeworld” of ICT 
 
Contemporary organizational sciences are no exception to a general rule, which 
holds in modern academic communities. Their representatives can be divided 
into the camp of those who believe that there is an external, objective reality “out 
there”, pursued by all scientists, natural and social alike, and into the camp of 
those who believe that social sciences, as opposed to the natural ones, deal with a 
reality, which has been intentionally constructed and is being continuously 
reconstructed by human agents, both individual and collective. The debate 
remains undecided and clearly is being negotiated in a provisional and tentative 
way, by a tacit peer pressure and other forms of lobbying, none of them 
methodologically legitimate. This state of affairs is at least a century old, but 
introduction of ICT provided a new twist in an old methodological tale.  
 
Early in the XXth century this difference resulted in a methodological debate on 
the status of historical and sociological research. It has been decided that natural 
scientists explain discovering general laws, while social scientists describe and 
interpret discovering meanings and intentions and offering new interpretations 
To put it in a nutshell – natural scientists explain (no need to suspect nature of 
playing games – “God does not play dice” in Einstein’s famous dictum), while 
social scientists interpret (for instance – a validity of the sale of Manhattan by 
Indiands to the Dutch, or a validity of an armed intervention of the United 
Nations and NATO in Kosovo, or intellectual property in the Internet). Natural 
scientists discover general laws ( since they pursue “nomothetic” sciences), while 
social scientists offer new understanding (pursuing “idiographic” sciences). The 
answer to a question “does history make sense?” is thus positive, but restricted. It 
does, but not once and not for all. Its sense is subject to revisions and 
reinterpretations, changes and negotiations. But what about theories in natural 
sciences? Well, they are in exactly the same situation – but positivists have been 
slow about acknowledging it, creating an impression that theories of natural 
sciences are somehow more universal than those of the social sciences. A more 
careful examination of natural sciences – however rarely undertaken by 
researchers from outside of the ruling paradigm – usually suffices to demonstrate 
mutability of theories and methodologies in physics or biology, chemistry or 
medicine. Unfortunately, only rarely do these changes actually draw attention of 
a more general public (as has recently been the case with the possible 
undermining of an assumed constant in Einstein’s equations, namely the velocity 
of light) and even less frequent are events, which demonstrate that theories in 
natural sciences are as much social constructs as those in the humanities. This 
duality has remained, although philosophical and methodological formulae 
underwent a very long evolution from a Viennese circle of neopositivists, who 
believed that philosophy of science can be reduced to a logical analysis of a 
language of science (Carnap) to a contemporary philosopher of sciences, 
employed in Paris and Harvard, who claims that: 
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“This whole tired question of the correspondence between words and the world 
stems from a simple confusion between epistemology and the history of art. We 
have taken science for realist painting, imagining that it made an exact copy of 
the world. The sciences do something else entirely – paintings too, for that 
matter. Through successive stages they link us to an aligned, transformed, 
constructed world. We forfeit resemblance, in this model, but there is a 
compensation: by pointing with our index fingers to features of an entry printed 
in an atlas, we can, through a series of uniformly discontinuous transformations, 
link ourselves to Boa Vista.”(Latour, 1999, 78-9) 
 
Recent theoretical developments and methodological debates in social sciences; 
sociology, social psychology, philosophy of science and economics illustrate the 
re-emergence of this age-old dilemma. On the one hand we encounter the 
positivists, who want to police academic communities sticking to their belief in 
neo-positivism as the only philosophy of science allowing for a pursuit of truth. 
Their dogmatism became somewhat muted, and one of their most famous 
representatives, a founding father of sociobiology, has recently limited his claims 
to the universal validity of a neo-positivist approach to a concept of consilience. 
In spite of all the differences between natural and social scientists E.O. Wilson 
believes that everything in real world is organized according to a relatively 
limited number of fundamental principles (“natural laws”), which can be 
discovered in each branch of learning, no matter how relativistic and socially 
constructed it’s theoretical framework may seem to be (Wilson, 1998).  
 
On the other hand we encounter social constructivists, who want academic 
communities to accommodate spatial, temporal and methodological 
relativism(1). All these debates result in provisional armistice but no permanent 
peace treaty in philosophy of science. Rival paradigms can compromise and 
admit the other’s right to existence for pragmatic reasons. However, as soon as 
one of them acquires a dominant position in academic establishments, lack of 
permanent peace treaties allows to re-open hostilities (usually be denying the 
representatives of another paradigm access to periodicals, peer control and 
funding, crowding them out from Ph.D. programs and tenures, or even from 
popular media). Organizational sciences – which emerged in the border area 
between sociology, economics and political sciences – are trying to come to 
terms with these troubled and complex legacies. Borders between paradigms, 
theories and domains of academic inquiry, areas of practical applications and 
specialized competences are contested and fought daily, as empirical analyses of 
scientific and scholarly journals clearly indicate. Due to the academic politics, 
many methodological struggles have been thoroughly politicized by racial 
minorities, generational cohorts, gender movements, political radicals and by 
other critics of the academic and political establishments.(2) Methodological 
clashes and paradigmatic struggles failed to result in a consensus among 
academic communities of practice. The fact that every theory comes with a 
paradigmatic price tag attached (i.e. with some blind spots in empirical research 
and with some gaps in possible applications) is often denied, but always brought 
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up by paradigmatic competitors. Each paradigm can and will be contested by 
representatives of competing paradigms (though historical and sociological 
processes can result in muffling the effect of this critique by refusing, for 
instance, to publish it in acknowledged journals or present it at prestigious 
conferences). To be classified along with the representatives of a rival paradigm 
can have serious consequences for a researcher’s career. It is only after the initial 
imbalance between a dominant positivist paradigm and the social constructivist 
paradigm has been remedied by creating an alternative sequence of communities 
of practice, scholarly and scientific journals and international conferences that 
social constructivism’s chances of academic survival have risen(3). Does it mean 
that we are nowadays dealing with a free marketplace of academic ideas? 
Perhaps, but even if it is a marketplace, it is a strongly controlled and a quasi-
monopolistic one, since the results of an almost two centuries long virtual 
monopoly of neo-positivists in most academic communities are not easily undone 
within two decades of challenges. 
 
Most theoretical approaches towards social reality and most scientific 
explanations of social processes have been shown to manifest a particular 
ideological bias (they are “embedded” in cultural and institutional clusters). For 
instance, if we scan the domain of organizational sciences, we can easily 
discover that a vast majority of research studies have been undertaken with 
“managerialist” ideological assumptions. It is often tacitly assumed that scientific 
studies should be an instrument for top managers helping them to gear people, 
material resources and all sorts of relationships to a single end. Studies 
undertaken on behalf of the employees or of those marginalized and excluded 
from running companies and organizations, or those excluded from the lists of 
stakeholders to be consulted, are fewer and further between. Contested 
ideological assumptions are sometimes laid bare, but not in the routine 
proceedings of “normal science”, from which they are usually dismissed as 
“unscientific” - as if unquestioned support for the top management rested on firm 
“scientific” fundaments, and as if top managers always knew what was best for 
them and for their companies.  
 
It is ironic that a much needed support in redressing the abovementioned 
imbalance between well established positivist academic doctrine and the 
upcoming social constructivist paradigm arrived from unexpected quarters – 
namely from the ranks of the system scientists and a growing community of 
knowledge on information and communication technologies (ICT) in 
organizations. Writing on the positivist doctrine in academic research as an 
impediment in developing an understanding and an explanation of organizational 
change, Claudio Ciborra stated plainly that: 
 
“the information systems field, with its rational views of knowledge, decision 
making, strategy, and orderly systems development, is based on a narrow model 
of rational, ideal actors”(Ciborra, 2002, 9) 
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He postulates that in order to overcome the limitations of a scientific paradigm 
that “looms large” over the ICT-related organizational developments we should: 
“point to an alternative center of gravity; human existence in everyday life” 
(ibid.) In order to drive the point home, Ciborra refers to one of the strongest 
anti-positivist philosophies of the XXth century, namely a phenomenology of 
Edmund Husserl, who analyzed an embedding of scientific categories in 
pragmatic activities of an individual to make sense of his or her daily experience 
(“life world”). Instead of following Wilson’s idea of consilience, he postulates an 
arbitrary alignment of entities measured by a community of academic specialists 
“out there”: 
 
“As Husserl points out, we tend to apprehend and explain the world with the help 
of categories that claim to define it objectively as a set of given objects and 
relationships, existing in themselves and capable of being grasped by exact 
measurement methods. For example, we come to believe that alignment (or lack 
of it) is out there, and that we need to measure it more exactly, so that we will 
then be able to re-engineer it. 
 
But such a would-be scientific view of the world is only one among many, 
the outcome of the practice of a sub-community of specialists. The world out 
there is the precondition for our understanding of such models and 
methods; thus it presupposes them, and is far from being presupposed by 
them.(bold type mine – S.M.) 
 
Translated into our case, there is no pure alignment to be measured out there. It is 
on the contrary our pre-scientific understanding of, and our participation in, the 
world of organizations that gives to the notion of alignment a shaky and 
ephemeral existence as an abstraction in our discourses and 
representations.”(op.cit.23-24) 
 
The idea that academic communities do not work according to the universally 
valid principles of a single, universal logic, but pursue their research guided by 
shaky and ephemeral paradigms, offers little comfort to figures of academic 
authority. However, in an age of learning, in an environment of open, 
democratic, agile, “platform”-like and flexible organizations, these anti-positivist 
voices are being received more favourably than ever before. One does not have 
to become a full-time relativist to notice significance of improvisation in 
academic communities of practice. 
 
 
2. Organizing : “leveling vagueness” of double interacts  
   
What do we call "organizations"? “Institutions”? “Companies”? “Governments”? 
Grass-roots citizens’ initiatives? Universities? What are their organizational 
identities? What we usually mean when we say “organizations” are in fact huge 
and complex flows of interpersonal interactions, with a high level of uncertainty 
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about the outcomes of all individual interacts and negotiations. In the words of a 
social psychologist and a theoretician of organization, Karl Weick, we should be 
speaking of organizing and not of organizations, and we should be using verbs 
and gerunds instead of nouns. Using nouns we  "reify" some aspects of the 
processes and turn a blind eye to the flows of processes from which they 
emerged and in which they are continuously being modified. We turn a blind eye 
to the fact that real life consists of interacts and not of meeting rooms, files and 
name tags in an organizational diagram or  organigram. Using verbs and gerunds 
we account for the dynamic, processual nature of organizational realities. Hence 
the title of Weick's most influential study - "Social Psychology of Organizing" 
(and not - of "Organizations"). Hence also significance of empirical studies of 
actual interactions and actual sense-making procedures in real settings. Therefore 
cultural anthropology turned out to be much more important than psychology in 
furnishing methodology for studying sensemaking in organizations (cf. Geertz, 
2000). Cultural anthropology cannot be replaced with, for instance, geometry of 
social forms or of interactive patterns (though there are attempts to follow this 
route mostly in order to increase the semblance of formalization). This 
significance of social constructivist approach has tacitly been recognized in both 
academic communities and in business companies subjected to a rapid, far-
reaching change of the entire organizational identity. When Olivetti went from 
typewriters to computers to integrated telecommunications there was very little 
of a solid world out there and core identity had to be thoroughly re-engineered. 
No wonder Olivetti hired Ciborra and not a more positivistically inclined 
consulting or academic adviser to help them muddle through the uncertain 
choices. That Ciborra quotes favourably Weick’s reconstruction of the Mann 
Gulch disaster should come as no surprise either – though it might surprise those 
researchers who had marginalized social constructivists hoping to crowd them 
out of the consulting services for business community.  
 
Important advances in social constructivist organizational science have been 
linked to research conducted by Karl Weick. He has been asking simple 
questions; what do people do when they organize? What actually happens when 
individuals interact? Most of the definitions used on organizational sciences rely 
on a rational choice theory. Thus we hear that organizations are purposive 
patterns of cooperation arranged to reach certain goals. Decision-making is a 
rational process, only slightly blurred by bounded rationality. In order to 
understand organizations we have to follow the organigrams, analyze what 
mangers communicate to their employees and study implementation of business 
plans. None of these appealed to Weick. He went after actual flows of 
organizing. According to him, real organizational life flowed around and 
between solid bricks of functions and hierarchies. He has been profoundly 
distrustful of the tacit rational choice theory.  He has been particularly 
dissatisfied with the infamous “prisoner’s dilemma” – a model of decision-
making under conditions of uncertainty, detecting too many too formalist, 
idealist assumptions about an individual as a rational choice vehicle. This model 
is based on a very narrow understanding of rationality – namely as the 
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instrumental one. Individual agents make rational choices trying to maximize 
their gain and competing against other individuals, who pursue the same strategy 
from their point of view. While rational choice theory is still tacitly 
acknowledged by most of the mainstream positivist social scientists (and is also 
responsible for sterility and irrelevance of mainstream economic and social 
sciences in general), it is already meeting increasing resistance of social 
scientists. For instance, sociologists argue against colonizing effects of this 
approach: 
 
“The objective environment cannot be reduced to the costs incurred in 
maximizing our independent and individual preferences, since the socio-
historical context shapes preference formation itself(Wagner). Nor can our 
subjectivity be reduced to cost-benefit analysis, since as moral and affective 
beings we pursue other goals in other ways (Archer and Williams). (…) Rational 
choice theory concept of rationality is defective in itself and deficient as a 
solution.”(Archer, Tritter, 2000, 6) 
 
Sharing these sentiments three decades earlier, Weick decided to develop a 
processual social ontology, which did not have to assume a rational choice of an 
isolated individual as a basic building block of organizational and social reality. 
Weick is not a philosopher, so his designs never assumed a form of a complete 
philosophical doctrine (though some other researchers, especially in Denmark,  
have thought about exploiting Heidegger to this purpose). Starting with a concept 
of a minimal social situation (what it takes to interact and how many parties are 
there all the time – two or three?) he echoed the debates of early sociologists – 
Durkheim and Simmel, who have also been asking questions about minimal 
social situation (Simmel thought that a triad of three interacting individuals is the 
basic component of social situations) and about assembly rules of society 
(Durkheim thought that cultural, particularly religious values acted as supra-
individual selective devices for new forms of behaviour, allowing a selection of 
those acts, which supported social order and limited social “anomie”). Minimal 
social situations are made to be assembled as events in series – hence the concept 
of the so-called double interact. What is a double interact? When A reacts upon 
seeing B, B replies, and then A talks back, responding to a reply. A possibility of 
endless sequences being strung out of this interact is obvious. Weick thought that 
this is where sources of order in an apparently chaotic and complex reality of 
modern organizations are to be found.  
 
He has also quoted a famous anecdote of two watchmakers, Hora and Tempus, 
invented by Herbert Simon. Both watchmakers start with the same task of 
assembling watches. Each watch requires putting 1000 parts together. They work 
with the same speed. Their only constraint is that whenever a phone rings, they 
have to drop parts they have in hand and answer it. A chance that their phone 
rings is 1:100. Tempus goes about assembling watches from part 1 to part 1000. 
If a phone rings when he has 999 parts in hand, he has to scramble them anew. 
Hora has his parts sub-assembled into tens and tens into hundreds. His highest 
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risk is loosing 99 parts. No wonder Hora is much more effective than Tempus. 
The same holds true for organizations. If they can rely on intermediate stable 
forms (read: smaller components, self-sufficient business units, self-governing 
teams, etc.) – they will accomplish their goals even if organization is 
reengineered, environment unstable and employees get interrupted. If double 
interacts survive and flourish – the organization as a whole is safer, more robust 
and reliable than the one, which cannot fall back on them. The problem is, of 
course, that it is not very easy for top managers to manage basic interacts, not 
even to monitor them with sufficient regularity.  
 
Weick’s major contribution to the social constructivist theory of organization 
was linked to the insertion of an alternative approach calling for research 
attention to the lowest level operatives, to the reconstruction of their double 
interacts and their sensemaking procedures, to the empirical description of 
organizational reality most mainstream organization theoreticians would never 
even try to notice. His opening of new methodological perspectives coincided 
with growth of research conducted according to naturalistic methodology 
allowing participating observation, closer collaboration with low-level 
employees of an organization and – generally speaking – a more participative, 
constructivist research. Another significant development was linked to a critical 
discourse analysis (language of managers has been scrutinized and its ideological 
and power components identified). This latter approach often found theoretical 
support in the concept of deconstruction (introduced by Derrida) and by the 
researchers pursuing hermeneutical interpretation and critical deconstruction of 
organizational languages (cf. Guba, Lincoln, 1989, Alvesson, Skoldberg, 2000, 
Alvesson, Deetz, 2000). Virtually absent from mainstream academic 
publications, this new generation of critical organizational researchers has 
already been acknowledged in serious academic resource books – cf., for 
instance,  Hatch's discussion of the most popular and fertile research paradigms 
(cf. Hatch, 1999). Young researchers close their Ph.D. theses with statements 
demonstrating the impact of social constructivism on methodological preferences 
of research communities: 
 
“The moral of the story, if there has to be one, is to be neither too vague, nor too 
precise; just vague enough. If goals, research phenomena, or companies, are too 
vaguely described, it might be easy to get lost. There is nowhere to start from, 
nothing to work with, nothing to stand on. Excessive vagueness paralyses action 
and complete chaos prevails. On the other hand, if goals, research phenomena, or 
companies are too precisely stated, then the whole group loses. None sees room 
for peculiarities; nor is there place for individual initiative or local adaptation. 
Excessive precision ignores the particulars – stiffness dominates. The quiz lies in 
leveling vagueness so that there is room for change and adaptation, space for the 
peculiar. Chaos and disorder menace on one side; rigidity and authoritarianism 
on the other. The fuel for action and constructive interaction lays in the delicate 
leveling of vagueness.”(Barinaga, 2002,159) 
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Weick had started with a critical analysis of a gap between actual activities of 
organizing and theories managers justified their actions with. In many cases he 
found that mangers - contrary to empirical evidence and their own actions - 
believed in "cause maps", in unilateral causation, independent variables, single 
origins, end phases, etc. The same managers did, however, intuitively grasp that 
causal loops are more frequent than linear cause-effect sequences, that children 
socialize parents, responses affect stimuli, means affect ends and actions affect 
desires. In order to explain these causal loops, Weick decided to analyze 
organizational processes in terms of interlocked behaviours, which are being 
selected, and then reinforced and retained or rejected and changed though the 
organizing activities. An individual drifts through repeated interactions, being 
partially included in many behavioural interacts and retrospectively assigning 
meaning ("making sense") of his or her organizational life. In spite of continuous 
flux organizations do not fall apart even if many individuals and groups abandon 
or harm them, or when external pressures and internal conflicts threaten them, 
because of the relative stability of double interacts being constantly assembled 
and re-assembled by individuals who intuitively reduce uncertainty by 
cooperating, by following predictable patterns of behaviour and thus by 
stabilizing some of the ongoing organizational events around them. In Weick's 
terms they "enact" their organizational environment, thus co-constructing 
organizational realities as the go along: 
 
"We have purposely labeled the organizational equivalent of variation enactment 
to emphasize that managers construct, rearrange, single out and demolish many 
"objective" features of their surroundings. When people act, they unrandomize 
variables, insert vestiges of orderliness, and literally create their own constraints. 
This holds true whether these constraints are created in fantasy to justify avoided 
tests or created in actuality to explain tangible bruises."(Weick, 1979,164) 
 
 
3. Real life extreme cases and social constructivism 
 
Weick's theory of the evolutionary drift of organizational forms emerging out of 
the continuous flow of organizing processes leads to two major classes of 
hypotheses. According to the first class of hypotheses, ecological changes in the 
environment of organizations favour agility, variety and speed - those 
organizational forms which turn out to be more flexible, more loosely structured 
and more improvised on the spur of the moment, tend to be also quicker in 
exploiting evolutionary windows of opportunity. Moreover, their advantage rests 
not only with the ability to scan changing environment better – it is also linked to 
their better maintenance of double interacts and loose couplings, the nuts and 
bolts of organizing. One should add that Weick has never expressed any views 
on the so called population ecology of organizations – a small school of thought 
in organizational sciences which attempts to save the neopositivist assumptions 
by introducing a comparative study of formal features of large numbers of 
organizations. Followers of this school hope to come up with valid covering laws 
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expressing universal preconditions for organizational survival and growth. They 
employ a biological metaphor by suggesting that a managerial DNA of a 
successful organizational species can be discovered and manipulated in creating 
and maintaining future organizations  – very much in the spirit of Wilson’s 
infamous sociobiology. So far, most of the formalizations failed to meet the level 
of relevance and are basically a formalized reformulation of common sense 
intuitions about survival ands failure of organizations. But since they offer a 
chance for a dominant neo-positivist doctrine to rejuvenate itself – chances of 
academic success, or at least of prolonged fighting against the coming social 
constructivist barbarians, are quite high.  
 
According to the second class of hypotheses, when organizing, managers and 
managed should avoid reifications, stimulate creativity and generally attempt at 
“leveling vagueness”. For instance, if some of the loosely structured research 
communities (which appear much in want of discipline to their professional 
supervisors, who sometimes are selected from outside of the community of 
practice, as is the case with deans who are mangers rather than academics) with 
too much of an organizational slack built into them (according to the public 
authorities or business communities) are disciplined by managers obsessed by 
criteria of utility, and bureaucratic discipline, their ability to creatively respond to 
future challenges gradually declines. Organizations loose a requisite variety of 
organizing options and can only function within an existing environment. Any 
changes and any unpredicted challenges pose a potential threat, since organizing 
resources have been lost to a temporary freeze-frame of managerial control. In 
his latest study entitled "Making Sense of Organizations" Weick presents a 
number of research projects conducted within the social constructivist school of 
thought by listing their common themes. These themes are linked to the 
irrationality of some decision-making processes (organizations are less rational 
than their managers would like us to believe, employees may pursue value 
rationality rather than instrumental one, etc.), internal segmentation 
(organizations are more segmented and far more loosely coupled than their 
monolithic self-descriptions and neopositivist models indicate) and a relatively 
small size of stable organizational segments. He sums his discussion up in the 
following way, drawing our attention to significance of reiterated improvisation: 
 
"Newer models of organization suggest that order occurs in unexpected places 
and spans fewer people for shorter periods than we thought. These newer 
proposals, however, do not claim that order is completely absent. Organizations 
may be anarchies, but they are organized anarchies. Organizations may be 
loosely coupled, but they are loosely coupled systems. Organizations may resort 
to garbage can decision making, but garbage cans have borders that impose some 
structure"(Weick, 2001, 34) 
 
Nevertheless, extreme distrust of rational choice theories has generated a number 
of critical, alternative approaches to organizational studies, some of them with a 
political agenda. For instance, there is a political agenda of feminists, ecologists, 
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Afro-Americans trying to undo the long-term effects of racism and 
discrimination, and obviously there are hidden agendas of various 
methodological schools within the academic communities of practice. The latter, 
however, stand a better chance of checking their assumptions against actual 
empirical data than broad political groups. This is due to the fact that even the 
most extreme academic schools accept the authority of empirical verification, 
which is relatively simpler than a political verification of a party program (since 
politicians can claim interfering influences of political opponents and unforeseen 
circumstances): 
 
"In our dealings with empiricism - broadly defined here as all research in which 
"pure data" or 'uninterpreted" facts are the solid bedrock of research - we try to 
take account of the objections which had been raised by hermeneuticians, critical 
theorists, poststructuralists, linguistic philosophers, discourse analysts, feminists, 
reflectivists and other trouble-makers - who implicitly or explicitly leave their 
readers despairing and irresolute vis a vis empirical research - we stubbornly 
claim that it is pragmatically fruitful to assume the existence of a reality beyond 
the researcher's egocentricity and the ethnocentricity of the research community 
(paradigms, consciousness, text, rhetorical manoeuvring), and that we as 
researchers should be able to say something insightful about this reality. This 
claim is consistent with a belief that social reality is not external to the 
consciousness and language of people - members of a society as well as 
researchers (who, of course, are members of a society)."(Alvesson, Skoldberg, 
2000, 3) 
  
The Challenger disaster belongs to the most often quoted cases, since it has been 
analyzed by Karl Weick along with the Mann Gulch firefighting disaster and the 
crash of KLM jet liner in Teneriffe airport, to mention but the most dramatic 
ones. Other authors tackled the poisonous leak in Union Carbide's Indian plant in 
Bhopal and the nuclear power plant incident on a Three Mile Island or 
companies as different as those running the Seattle ferries or those trying to 
preserve the traditional managerial authority with intricate meeting and speech 
rituals in Sweden. 
 
The Challenger disaster, in which all astronauts died, was caused by leaking 
rings, which were supposed to seal the fuel tank attached to the booster rocket 
carrying space shuttle into the orbit. Fuel tank had to be carried by the rocket in 
the first phase of the flight immediately after launching. Rings have been 
supplied by Morton Thiokol's company. Thiokol's engineers have advised against 
launching, since they claimed that a particular range of temperatures at the 
planned time of the launching were exactly the temperatures at which the seals 
they had manufactured could spring a leak. They had voiced their opposition 
very forcefully, but limited their discussion to their own engineering team. Their 
view was taken further to the managerial team of NASA by a representative of 
their company, who did not have a technical background. He passed their 
warning on, but without the underlying reasoning. Moreover, he passed his 
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warning on by telephone and not in a face to face communication, which further 
reduced additional clues he might have conveyed with his posture, facial 
expression and added emphasis: 
 
"Communication between Morton Thiokol and NASA about the wisdom of 
launching Challenger in unusually cold temperatures was made by conference 
telephone call, a medium with less variety than face-to-face conversation. With 
only voice cues, NASA did not have visual data of facial expression and body 
cues, which might have given them more vivid information about the intensity of 
Thiokol's concerns."(Weick, 2001, 333) 
 
Since most of the members of the NASA decision-making team were not familiar 
with technological aspects of fuel tank safety, they voted for launching (for 
economic and political reasons) and Thiokol's technical advice was overruled. 
Expected failure of the rings provided by Thiokol did, indeed take place, and the 
leak of fuel led to an explosion of a booster rocket and a destruction of a space 
shuttle with all astronauts aboard. When reconstructing the decision-making at 
the NASA, an SC researcher tries to interpret cognitive maps of organizational 
realities, which guided actions of relevant participants. He also tries to predict 
what might have prevented a similar set of members of an organization from 
making a similar mistake in future by constructing a different "reality" for 
decision makers: 
 
"What all of this leads us to is an unusual reconstruction of the events of the 
night of January 27, 1986, when NASA was arguing with Morton Thiokol about 
whether freezing weather would disable the booster rocket. That conversation 
apparently took the traditional course of people arguing in linear, sequential 
fashion, about the pros and cons of a launch. If, somewhere in these discussions, 
someone has said, "That reminds me of a story", a different rationality might 
have been applied and a different set of implications might have been drawn. 
Those, in turn, might have led to a different outcome. There are precedents in 
history. The solution of the Cuban missile crisis by a surgical airstrike was 
dropped when Robert Kennedy recalled the story of Pearl Harbour, and portrayed 
a U.S. attack on Cuba as Pearl Harbour in reverse."(Weick, 2000, 342) 
 
As should be clear from cases discussed above by the representatives of social 
constructivism, researchers in organizational sciences are trying to generate new 
insights with their interpretation of critical events, to subject them to a critical 
analysis (sometimes exploring domination and repression) and finally to generate 
"transformative re-definition indicating alternative ways of imagining and 
relating to what exists"(Alvesson, Deetz, 2000, 164). Other applications of social 
constructivist paradigm in social science research can be found in political 
ethnography as practiced by Michael Burawoy and his collaborators in Berkeley 
and within globally distributed network of researchers (cf. Burawoy and Verdery, 
1999, Burawoy et al, 2000).  
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4. Social constructivism’s impact upon sciences of organization:  
 
Are social scientists in general and organizational scientists in particular a 
paradigmatic minority among researches in management and organization 
compared to the well entrenched representatives of a positivist and conformist 
view of science? Yes and no. Yes, if numbers of academic handbooks of 
management and organizational behaviour, development and change are being 
compared. Most of the popular handbooks are still being written from a dominant 
paradigmatic perspective – a neopositivist one. No, if scholarly and scientific 
debates and polemics are being compared; the constructivist and critical 
perspective is gaining ground and dominant paradigm systematically fails to 
meet the expectations of researchers, politicians and business managers. This is 
why representatives of social constructivism have already managed to acquire a 
firm foothold in research centers, conference networks, editorial boards of 
professional publications, at the universities and in scientific communities of 
practice. Suffice it to scan calls for papers for conferences or special issues of 
established periodicals in order to notice announcements like the one below: 
 
“The special issue on organizing knowledge wants to step back from the 
engineering approach to knowledge. We invite contributors to reflect on the 
contradicting relation of knowledge and management. We also invite a broad 
social, historical, political, ethical and philosophical reflection on the relations of 
knowledge, practices of organizing, knowledge society, managerial knowledge, 
and the complex strategies through which the employee selves are constituted. At 
the same time, we encourage contributing authors to consider that the readers of 
International Journal of Internet and Enterprise Management include 
practitioners and policy makers apart from scholars. We emphasize strongly the 
value of creativity on behalf of the authors sharing what can be learnt from their 
texts.”(Hjorth, 2002). 
 
More radical representatives of social constructivism have successfully criticized 
a dominant ideology of managerialism in organizational sciences, i.e. an 
ideology, which claims that all issues encountered in all organizations can be 
solved when reduced to instrumental questions of proper management. Even 
high-ranking officials of World Bank (Stieglitz) have increasingly become aware 
of the limitations of this managerialization of the world (the excluded do talk and 
strike back), but academic communities have been more reluctant to pick this 
critique up (being dependent on government funding and business need for 
expertise). These developments made academic communities aware of a 
professional conformism of researchers. This in-built conformism limits critical 
assessment of dominant theories and paradigms and isolates academic 
communities against new paradigms and theories. Young researchers are 
dependent on senior ones for funds and advancement according to peer control 
and are easily socialized into paradigmatic loyalties. This mechanism slows 
down criticism of dominant theories and emergence of new ones, and damages 
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growth of knowledge in general. Representatives of social constructivism often 
point out that a dominant position of a neo-positivist paradigm in scientific 
communities is being legitimized with an ideology of scientific progress (which 
implicitly implies that rival paradigms are unscientific and harmful to scientific 
progress) and sustained by an illusion of rapid cumulative advances of 
knowledge; 
 
 "There is little sense to be made of the view that scientific research moves us 
ever closer to "the truth". There is no convincing account of how an array of 
syllables (scientific theory) can increasingly "capture the contours" of what 
exists. Further, there are important advantages in abandoning the view of science 
as a march to the truth. First, we remove the competitive posture of the sciences, 
the attempt to narrow down the range of ideas to the "single best" approximation 
of reality. Rather, we are invited by constructionist arguments to sustain a 
multiplicity to keep myriad images and metaphors alive. In this respect it is not 
an embarrassment to physics to sustain boh the wave and particle theories of 
light; nor is it a problem of psychology that there are multiple theories of mental 
disorder. With multiplicity comes flexibility. Further, by removing the ideal of 
"the single truth", we open the door to wide-ranging participation in the 
dialogues of science. Progress for one is peril for another; the social and ethical 
significance of scientific inquiry should be subject to broadest scrutiny" (Gergen, 
1999, 238-9). 
 
Less radical representatives of social constructivism (either in a political sense of 
being less critical about academic communities and peer policing or in a 
methodological sense of being more accommodating and less "dogmatic" vis a 
vis the other paradigms) have continued their research and teaching with a 
relatively high degree of acceptance and with a number of interesting theories to 
their names, for instance theories of social resources mobilization (explaining the 
emergence of ne social movements - cf. McCarthy, Zald, 1979),  re-
individualization of social life and collective identities (Melucci, 1989,1996), 
network societies and social impact of the Internet (Castells, 1996, 2001), 
reflexive modernization and economies of signs and space (Lash, 1999, Lash, 
Urry, 1994), various aspects of globalization (Featherstone, Lash, Robertson, 
1995), management of consumption (Ritzer, 1996,2001), social geography and 
experience of urban spaces (Harvey, 1996, 2000),  face to face interaction 
(Turner, 2002) and many others. Even in less radical representatives of social 
constructivism there is a trace of a critical attitude towards organizational 
realities and a preference for a developing knowledge conducive to a change 
rather than to a preservation of a status quo at the organizational level. Thus in a 
study by J.H. Turner, "Face to Face. Toward a Sociological Theory of 
Interpersonal Behaviour", we read that: 
 
"When people are happy, they rarely push for change; when they are angry, 
fearful or sad, they are generally open to alternative ways of interacting and 
relating to corporate and categoric units. Indeed, it is their negative energy 
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directed at corporate and categoric units that makes people receptive to changing 
these units. The more the negative emotional energy  aroused at the level of the 
encounter and the more this encounter is connected to other encounters where 
negative emotional energy exists, the greater will be the effects of emotional 
arousal in one encounter on others, especially when calls for change are couched 
in rituals increasing positive emotions focussed on alternatives to the conditions 
generating negative emotional energy. The key to mobilization of people's 
sentiments to collective action has always been to tap into negative emotions, 
particularly those directed at corporate and categoric units as well as the more 
inclusive institutional domains in which they are embedded , and then to use 
highly ritualized behaviours to intensify these emotions while, at the same time, 
offering an alternative that can arouse positive emotional energy about the future. 
All charismatic leaders have understood this force, and many less charismatic 
holders of authority and prestige have used it to their advantage to change 
mesostructures."(Turner, 2002,249) 
 
But “people” (employees, clients, citizens, voters) obviously are not “happy” 
with the aftermath of the liberal reconstruction of world order after the 
breakdown of state socialist system. One of the manifestations of this 
dissatisfaction is the emergence of critical paradigms in organizational sciences. 
Another is being detected in organizational innovations pointing towards a 
network and a platform as a new generic form of organizing. Interestingly 
enough, some of representatives of social constructivism can be found in an 
emergent field of the Internet. For instance, when trying to answer to question 
“who controls the Internet?”, some of them are trying to demonstrate that neither 
“nobody” nor “AOL and US government” is correct. By doing so, they go 
beyond the purely institutionalist approach and claim that: 
 
“For any complex sociotechnical system, especially one that touches as many 
people as the Internet, control takes form of institutions, not commands. 
Contending parties work out rules and procedures that make their interactions 
less costly, more stable and predictable. They supplement these rules with 
organizations that monitor compliance and sanction those who break the rules. In 
such a process control is never perfect and no one gets exactly what he 
wants.(…) Institutional regimes, particularly at the international level, are not 
based on ideas or efficiency, but on political bargains over the distribution of 
wealth. (…) A restricted name space reinforces the land rush mentality and 
potential for abuse that created the conflicts to begin with. And by reinforcing 
problems, it rationalizes the continued existence of a restrictive regime that 
regulates the conflicts via collective action.(…) A form of positive feedback led 
to the formation and entrenchment of an inefficient regime, just as North 
described. It is the product of social processes locked into a dysfunctional pattern 
by a kind of recursive political logic that no one knows how to break out of. 
”(Mueller, 2002, 11 and 258-9)    
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5. Birth of social constructivism out of the spirit of radical politicized critique 
 
From the point of view of regulatory agencies of the Internet the above study by 
Mueller must be considered highly critical of institutional arrangements and 
organizing dynamics. Awareness that an institution owes its existence to a 
dysfunctional vicious circle does little to legitimize this institution’s continued 
existence. Social constructivism does not stand alone in this critical venture. It is 
considered to be one of the main theoretical manifestations of a critical phase in 
development of the European modernity, the one labeled postmodernity. Let us 
begin with a definition of modernity and postmodernity in order to better 
understand the position of critical theoreticians. 
 
The term modernity is used in order to describe a bunch of transformational 
processes, which impacted politics (especially the French and American 
revolutions), economics (especially since the commercial, capitalist and 
industrial revolutions) and science (especially since the encyclopaedist project of 
Enlightenment turned science into a socially privileged form of knowledge 
production). The last contemporary expression of the modernist project can be 
found in Fukuyama's "The End of History" (Fukuyama,1992), where a market 
economy and a parliamentary democracy are hailed as the only proper 
organizational frame for human evolution. However, this monopolistic 
explanation of modern societies has been rightly criticized. First, it does not offer 
an explanation of mounting problems of global inequalities, unemployment and 
gray economy, criminal and terrorist networks, and fundamentalist revivals. 
Second, it does not explain growing disenchantment with formal democracy 
(which deteriorates into a regent establishment) and with the not-so-invisible 
hand of the liberal market (which fails to include permanently unemployed 
sectors of western societies and permanently marginalized nations of the Third 
World). Third, it does not offer insights into knowledge production by 
incompatible theoretical means (different methodologies and paradigms, all of 
which are there to stay). Contemporary social scientists become increasingly 
aware that modernity may have run its course and that our way of thinking is 
drifting away from the basic assumptions of the Enlightenment. Postmodernity, a 
time of uncertainty with respect to our knowledge, doubt and competing claims 
for validity made by representatives of rival paradigms, has replaced modernity, 
a period of a secularized faith in progress (roughly from the French revolution to 
WWII). 
 
These views are not limited to the academic millieu. Comparing cultural, 
political and economic change in 43 societies, Ronald Inglehart came up with a 
theory of a postmodern shift in societal goals and individual values. According to 
him, traditional societies, before modernization took place, had focussed on 
survival in a steady-state economy, socialized individuals by making them 
internalize traditional religious and communal norms and legitimized power by 
traditional authorities. After modernization, the core societal project shifted to 
maximizing an economic growth. Individual values were linked to the 
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achievement motivation (fed by mass-scale upward mobility), and power holders 
were legitimized as rational-legal authorities (justified by a division of the world 
between nation-states). The postmodern turn replaced maximizing economic 
growth with maximizing a subjective well-being (hence the emergence of a 
consumer society and of an experience economy). The achievement motivation 
has been replaced with postmaterialist and postmodern values. Radical de-
emphasis of both legal and religious authorities means that there is no return to 
the premodern legitimizing of authorities (in spite of fundamentalist attempts to 
do exactly this). Both legal and religious authorities had been subjected to a 
critical scrutiny in powerful mass media and to regular institutionalized checks 
demanded by suspicious citizens (cf. Inglehart, 1997, 76). Due to the presence of 
modern mass media and new information  and communication technologies, 
individuals acquired access to many social processes, which became increasingly 
transparent and subject to an ongoing public criticism and re-engineering.  
Similar results have been obtained by studying shifts in individual values and 
societal norms towards the postmaterialist, postmodern ones, experienced by the 
European young generations in the last quarter of the XXth century (cf. 
Therborn, 1995). 
 
It is against this background of shifting societal and organizational, individual 
and cultural values (religious fundamentalism is also a form of cultural 
reengineering) that we should see the fiasco of a liberal attempt at a rejuvenation 
of earlier forms of capitalism and the present attempt to increase organizational 
choices in all walks of life. Founding fathers are, not surprisingly, among those 
who had already fought against neo-positivist doctrines in the 1930ies and 
against both naked violence of the state socialist regimes on the one hand and the 
“repressive tolerance” of liberal social order based on class struggle in home 
countries and colonial exploitation on a global scale on the other. Frankfurt 
School is clearly a critical case in point. Not surprisingly, European roots of 
social constructivism include phenomenological philosophy (as the major enemy 
of positivism in the academic communities) and critical theoreticians of the 
Frankfurt school (as politically uncompromised critics of nazism, Stalinism and 
capitalist mass culture at the same time). 
 
 
6. Social constructivism: a critical improvisation on managerialist theme 
 
We have been using the term social constructivism. What exactly does it mean? 
Social constructivism is a theoretical term used to characterize a family of 
theories and theoretical schools in social sciences. What do they have in 
common? They are explaining a social production of reality (i.e. processes 
through which human agents make sense of their relationships and activities) and 
social organization of knowledge (which allows us to make sense) through 
interactions and communications. Milder versions hold that social factors shape 
intersubjective interpretations of the world. Stronger versions hold that 
significant parts of social world, both cognitive and institutional, are constituted 
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by the very act of interpretation, or by a conflict and a negotiation of an accepted 
and shared meaning. Needless to say, the intentional nature of human agents and 
their complex reliance on cultural values play an important role in such 
interpretations:  
 
"What is special about culture is the manifestation of collective intentionality, 
and, in particular, the collective assignment of functions to phenomena, where 
function cannot be performed solely in virtue of sheer physical features of the 
phenomena. From dollar bills to cathedrals, and from football games to nation-
states, we are constantly encountering new social facts, where the facts exceed 
the physical features of the underlying physical reality"(Searle,1995,228). 
 
The first glimpse of social constructivism in sociology can be found in a 
monumental study "Polish Peasant in Europe and America" published by 
W.Thomas and F. Znaniecki in 1924 - they are credited with a statement that 
when people imagine and experience cultural and social constraints as real, then 
they are real in so far as they have material consequences. Znaniecki and Thomas 
got absorbed into the mainstream of Chicago sociology and their sociological 
method based on personal documents (letters, diaries) lost its innovative, critical 
edge. However, social criticism became widespread again in the 1960ies as an 
interpretative paradigm (first, in social psychology and sociology, then, in the 
1970ies, in organizational sciences). Prompted by rebellious students, researchers 
started focussing on the production of meaning and rediscovered phenomenology 
as one of the main anti-positivist schools in philosophy, which influenced 
methodology of social sciences. In 1966 a significant book by Berger and 
Luckman - "The Social Construction of Reality" presented a thesis that social 
reality as experienced by individual actors in modern fragmented society is a 
collage of multiple individual and collective interactions and interpretations - a 
social construction and not a stable, objective "external world". The authors were 
following a critical traditional of the leftist Frankfurt School, whose 
representative, Alfred Schutz, has been instrumental in merging the insights of a 
phenomenologist philosopher, Edmund Husserl and one of the major sociologists 
of the early XXth century, Max Weber.  
 
Meanwhile some schools in sociology (for instance - symbolic interactionism - 
cf. Goffman, 1959, ethnomethodology, Garfinkel, 1967) were focussing on 
interpretation of meanings attached by individuals and groups to patterns of 
activities and communications. Their writings, however, could only become 
acceptable to the academic communities of practice after Kuhn (cf. Kuhn, 1970) 
and Feyerbend (cf. Feyerabend, 1975) showed that changes of theoretical 
paradigms depend on historical and social contingencies and not on mythical 
“crucial experiments”. It became less risky for researchers to flirt with social 
constructivism also due to the fact that critical philosophies of language 
undermined the positivist view of scientific reasoning (Wittgenstein) and  
postmodernists (Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault, Bauman, Rorty, Sloterdijk) made 
relativist approach to scientific methodologies respectable.  
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Some modern representatives of social constructivism do not limit themselves to 
the acknowledgment of a difference between social and natural sciences, but 
claim that theories in physics or biology are also artificial social constructs, 
accepted because of the monopoly of science and a dictatorship of a single 
paradigm, and not because of some inherent superiority to rival explanations of 
physical reality (cf. Czarniawska, 1999, Gergen, 1999). Social constructivism, 
along with other postmodernist theoretical schools in organizational sciences, can 
perhaps best be viewed as "complicated series of cultural and theoretical 
inventions, each of which were adjustements to the realities of the world in the 
second half of the twentieth century" (Lemmert, 1997, 17). This dramatic turn in 
the philosophy and practice of social sciences, which stopped defending 
themselves against the positivists entrenched in natural sciences and struck back, 
winning many footholds in academic communities, has been caused by advances 
in history of science and cognitive psychology. In striking back and 
demonstrating that far from being universally valid, theories in natural sciences 
follow the same improvised twists as the ones in social science, critics took on a 
Darwinian theory of evolution. It been increasingly understood as a very 
influential, trend-setting and world-constructing science: 
 
"What most people saw as God-given design, (Darwin) saw as mere adaptations 
to circumstance, adaptations that were meaningless except for the way in which 
they helped an animal or plant to survive. Much of this was perhaps familiar to a 
nation immersed in competitive affairs: Darwin had transformed the generalized 
entrepreneurial ethos of English life into a biological theory which, in turn, 
derived much of its support from these all-pervasive commitments."(Browne, 
1995, 542-3)  
 
Social historians of science and technology have been quick to exploit this 
analogy between methodological and theoretical choices on the one hand and 
socio-historical context on the other. According to Steven Fuller, who has 
critically analyzed emergent knowledge management literature and criticized 
peer control as a mechanism responsible for conservatism and irrelevance of 
much of academic research: 
 
"The emergence of knowledge management as a field of inquiry has brought into 
view two conflicting intuitions that have informed Western conception of 
knowledge since the time of the Greeks. I have encapsulated this conflict as a 
military-industrial metaphor. The military side of the metaphor is that the pursuit 
of knowledge has clear goals that inquirers approximate to varying degrees. The 
industrial side is that knowledge is perpetually generated and accumulated, so 
that, like money, one can never have enough of it. The military metaphor attracts 
more sporting virtues, such as doing the most with the least, whereas the 
industrial metaphor attracts craft virtues such as hard work and attention to detail 
in product design. The former is aristocratic in origin, the latter plebeian, and, 
with the advent of scientific professionalization, it has become bourgeois. 
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Knowledge is "achieved" according to the military metaphor, "produced" 
according to the industrial one. (…) There are opportunities here for both an 
intelligent democratization of inquiry and a mindless natural selection of 
knowledge producers and products."(Fuller, 2002, 252-3)        
 
According to another historian of science and technology, David Noble (cf. 
Noble, 1986), different preferences of managers for specific types of knowledge 
can explain different trajectories of large scale organizational shifts during an 
implementation of a new technology. His study of robotization in the US 
manufacturing industries is a case in point. Managers have started introducing 
robots during the Korean war, when a rapid increase in army demand for 
airplanes and tanks made them look for quick increase in productivity. They have 
had fresh memories of full WWII employment and an equally recent history of 
successful strikes led by powerful trade unions. They distrusted their employees 
and applied top-bottom approach asking designers and academicians to develop a 
replacement for unruly labor. Situation was quite different in Japan. There, 
managers had no powerful trade unions to tackle – to the contrary, they had a 
disciplined labour force socialized for a collective action. They could thus safely 
rely on the best practices of the lowest employees - human operators of older 
machines, while designing the newer ones – i.e. industrial robots. This approach 
has often been called a player piano (player pianos have been constructed by 
recording a human performance on a punched card and then reproducing music 
mechanically according to a human original), bottom up procedure. As a result, 
robotization proceeded much more quickly and efficiently in Japan than in the 
USA, where it has been sabotaged by "excluded" human operators. If there was a 
dialogue between managers and employees, the US managers would be much 
better prepared to realize their dependence on a narrow class of knowledge 
products and to broaden a variety of potential solutions they could choose from. 
Noble's credentials as a historian are impeccable, but his academic career was not 
smooth, due mainly to the political thrust of his writings. In closing chapters of 
the abovementioned study, whose subtitle was "The Social History of Industrial 
Automation", he wrote that: 
 
"Technology is not the problem, nor is the solution. The problem is political, 
moral and cultural, as is the solution: a successful challenge to a system of 
domination, which masquerades as progress. Such a challenge will no doubt 
require opposition to technology in its present form - to buy time and cripple the 
current attack. And it will require political mobilization and vision, cultural 
inventiveness and rejuventation, and a revitalization of moral confidence. But it 
will also require once and for all a transcendence of the irrational and infantile 
ideology of technological progress which has confounded Western thinking for at 
least two centuries - an ideology, which has for too long obscured the realities of 
power in society, provided legitimation and cultural sanction for those who wield 
it, and paralyzed any and all opposition."(Noble, 1986,351) 
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Noble’s distrust of a shallow managerialism as an ideology of progress is echoed 
by other researchers’ fascination with Heidegger, as an early philosophical critic 
of neopositivist fascination with one-dimensional technological progress. This 
distrust towards the unholy alliances of knowledge and power symbolized by a 
shallow ideology of managerialism has been manifest in studies of critical 
theoreticians of organization (Boje on Nike, Ritzer on McDonald's, Urry on 
tourism, Debord on society of spectacle, Deetz on corporate communications, 
etc.) and is being continued also in critical studies of knowledge management 
and the philosophy of science (cf. Fuller, 2000, Boje, 2001).  
 
Other authors often write on "theories of stakeholder enabling", on "organization 
as a play of multiple and dynamic discourses" or on "ecological futures: systems 
theory, postmodernism and participative learning in an age of uncertainty" (all 
these titles are chapters from Boje, Gephart, Thatchenkery, 1996) and complain 
about the academic establishment's hostility towards critical theories of 
management in general, and of an ideology of managerialism in particular (one 
of the chapters in abovementioned book is tellingly entitled: "Storytelling at 
Administrative Science Quarterly: Warding Off  the Postmodernist Barbarians").  
Their experience was a share of numerous organizational scientists (e.g. 
Alvesson, Scott, Burrell, Morgan, Denzin, Burr, Lasch, Turner, Gergen, 
Smircich, Whitley, Cooper, Guba, Lincoln, Erlandson, Weick, Latour, Bourdieu, 
Geertz, Harvey), who have been developing critical research strategies. 
Theoretical approach of Weick, Guba, Licoln, Erlandson and Alvesson has been 
applied in organizational change theories in many academic centers, often 
encountering resistance of their academic communities (cf. van Dongen et al., 
1997, Magala, 1997). Generally speaking, the more socially relevant and 
academically accepted social constructivist theories are, the more frequent are 
the attempts of neopositivist establishments of academic communities to find a 
modus vivendi by isolating them and limiting their influence upon future 
researchers(4).  
 
Is there a way to assess future chances of social constructivism in academic 
institutions? Perhaps a recent emergence of experience economy (after 
manufacturing and service ones) offers a possibility for a more balanced 
reshuffling of academic cards. Neo-positivistic research methods are not 
particularly fit for investigating activities, which call for an understanding of 
client sensemaking and for a reconstruction of subjective memories of particular 
experiences. Tragedies and comedies in theatres of consumption and general 
fluidity of organizational forms are more convincingly distinguished and 
described by the representatives of social constructivism.     
 
 
  
Notes 
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(1) In spite of many other differences, most of the neopositivists and social  
constructivists would agree that a constructivist approach leads to 
relativist consequences, not all of which can be justified on political 
grounds. Kukla’s arguments stand: “Among constructivisms, the only 
variety that isn’t beset by serious conceptual problems is the type that I 
called reasonable constructivism. This is the unadventurous thesis that 
every society is able to construct facts about itself. At the other end of 
the scale of credibility is the strong constructivism which asserts that all 
ascertainable facts are constructed. This position is as indefensible as 
any philosophical stance can be. Strong constructivists have yet to show 
that the infinite regress of constructions generated by their thesis isn’t 
vicious, or that the temporal incongruities generated by their thesis 
admit of a coherent resolution. They also haven’t accounted for what 
happens when two societies construct incompatible facts. To my mind, 
the most telling argument against strong constructivism is also the 
simplest: if all facts are negotiable, then why does anybody ever feel the 
need to defend a favoured thesis against a factual objection? Why not 
simply deny the problematic fact? In light of all these unresolved 
difficulties, I think we’re justified in drawing the firm conclusion that 
the world exists.”(Kukla, 2000,160) 
 
(2) This politicization has not been lost on conservative critics of academic 
establishments. Any attempt at broadening access to higher education 
for formerly disadvantaged groups or at a more democratic campus polis 
are met with a stubborn refusal to see anything but a lamentable loss of 
standards. “While to cost of college education continues to spiral 
upward, the curriculum is becoming a wasteland as students design their 
own programs of study”(London, 2001,77) 
    
(3) What do we mean when we speak of social constructivist paradigm? A 
paradigm - is usually understood as a set of core assumptions of a 
school of thought differentiating its followers from the rest of a 
scientific community and generating scientific research programs. The 
term has been introduced by Kuhn in order to explain growth of 
knowledge and social processes within academic communities and 
developed by Musgrave, Lakatos and others.  Kuhn’s studies of 
scientific revolutions were triggered by a growing criticism of the 
increasingly sterile and socially irrelevant social sciences in the 1950ies 
and 1960ies. Academic establishments were totally dominated at the 
time by a positivist paradigm. Positivism is a school in philosophy 
(Comte) and a mainstream in the philosophy of science (Carnap). It has 
been tacitly and explicitly accepted by a majority of world research 
communities. It assumes an objective existence of the external world 
and views history of science as a gradual progress towards the truth - 
increasingly exact and precise description and explanation of this reality. 
It is heavily biased towards quantitative methods and towards a 
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conformist socialization of young researchers. Subjected to a 
philosophical criticism of Popper and his disciples (Lakatos, Giedymin, 
Feyerabend), positivism has been rejected in the 1960ies also on 
political and moral grounds. It has failed to respond to the challenge of 
postmodernism, but remains a dominant force in academic research 
communities. Postmodernism - a multifunctional term introduced by 
Lyotard to label an interparadigmatic interregnum after the decline of 
both neopositivist and postpopperian philosophy of science (ca. 1975-
2000), a general distrust of the "grand narratives" in philosophy, art 
(especially architecture) and politics, and increasing doubts about the 
feasibility of European modernization program symbolized by the 
Enlightenment ("postmodernity is modernity without illusions" 
according to Bauman). One of the postmodernist charges against 
positivists was that their methodologies reified ("froze") organizational 
world, impeding change and maintaining status quo increasingly 
challenged by various groups (e.g. feminists, antiglobalists, racial and 
ethnic minorities, ex-colonial societies, young generations). Reification 
- a tendency of managers and researchers to treat temporary 
conventions, definitions, relations and forms of organizing as objective 
reality, which obscures the processual nature of social reality and 
impedes effective managerial interventions and an authentic 
organizational change. Reification is one of the most important 
stumbling blocks in understanding social reality since it constraints 
individuals in their sensemaking activities and crowds out alternative 
conceptualizations of their experience. Sensemaking in organizations is 
an important activity allowing all members to contribute to their 
organization's functioning. Social life in general is based on a social 
construction of meanings attached to behaviour, relations and symbolic 
artefacts, sustained by the flow of reiterated interactions, "enacted" by 
individuals and groups and subjected to individual and collective 
changes through conflicts and negotiations. Accounting for this fact we 
have to decode, deconstruct, reconstruct and decipher construction acts 
of social reality - which is precisely why social constructivism came 
about. Social constructivism (constructionism) - a family of theories 
and methodologies in social sciences explaining how indviduals and 
groups "produce" social reality by generating meanings and interpreting 
relationships, interactions and environments. SC theories of organization 
focus on communication flows, power asymmetries and change 
processes. They share an assumption that individuals and organizations 
move in a socially constructed reality, which had been intersubjectively 
agreed upon and are sceptical about excessive claims to progress in 
scientific understanding of the world. They agree that in order to 
safeguard a sheer possibility of a better, more competitive adaptation to 
a changing reality, organizations should preserve a requisite variety, by 
resisting homogenizing pressures of control-based authoritarian 
management. Variety - flexible, loosely structured, networked 
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organizations with an in-built "slack" generate more internal variety 
from which more options can be chosen if changes in external 
environment require a re-adaptation and an organizational change. 
 
(4) The first outline of the present paper has been linked to a chapter for a 
handbook on organizational theory co-written with my colleague,  
M.Sanderse, who collaborated with me researching the extent of 
embedding of social constructivism in organizational sciences. This 
particular chapter has often been criticized as “too theoretical”, “too 
difficult for students”, “demanding many additional explanations” – all 
of which testify to the resistance against acceptance of this paradigm in 
mainstream social sciences. On the other hand, the very fact that a 
chapter on this paradigm was considered by the editors to be a necessary 
component of the book is a tacit acknowledgement of its growing 
significance for sciences of management.  
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